Economics coconuts capital island
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Islanders, too, hold supplies until they use their coconuts for purchases. Traders accumulate them pending their sale to. Coconuts play the part of a store of value mainly for brief periods. They constitute the staple food of the inhabitants as well as their staple exports. Car Nicobar produces a large exportable surplus of coconuts. The currency of Car Nicobar consists of coconuts. This chapter discusses the use of coconut as currency standard on the Nicobar Islands. Exports fell 40% during the same period, incoming investment fell faster than world-wide foreign direct investment trends and government expenditure increased as a proportion of GDP. Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) declined in the following five years: per capita GDP was no higher in absolute terms in 2003 than in 1998, and is now about US$1,150. Economic conditions The CRP did not meet many of its objectives. There was a feeling that trade relations would be enhanced under the WTO framework. A further impetus towards accession was that all Vanuatu's neighbours and principal trading partners were WTO members – Fiji, the Solomon islands, Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand. The economy was generally closed, while Vanuatu had always run a visible trade deficit some policy-makers and politicians felt that the economy should integrate more into the global economy. The import-substitution policy, followed since independence in 1980, was failing. As part of this last process the programme was directed at reducing trade barriers within the context of WTO membership. This set of reforms aimed to improve governance, enhance the role of the private sector, increase economic growth and further liberalize the economy. The problem in context The background to accession Vanuatu began its WTO accession process in July 1995, and the main momentum towards membership came in 1997 with the advent of a structural adjustment package known as the Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP). In the second stage, commonly referred to as the ‘bilateral stage’, applicants negotiate with individual WTO members on the terms of their goods offer, agricultural schedules and service sector commitments. It is this first and most significant of the inherent flaws in the accession process, and the ensuing abuse of power, that has resulted in the proliferation of ‘WTO-plus’ demands on new WTO applicants. Clearly, this stage of the accession process – wherein self-interested WTO members examine the WTO conformity of an applicant's trade regime, with neither the operation of any rules for the process of examination nor the applicant's having right of recourse to any review – is akin to having a complainant at a panel act as the sole panelist. In the first, referred to as the ‘protocol or multilateral stage’, members examine the trade regime of individual applicants, seeking clarification of, and often reforms to, the conduct of trade where they deem aspects to be in violation of existing WTO rules. The process normally proceeds through two logical stages. This chapter examines the accession process of Vanuatu, a small least developed country (LDC) in the Western Pacific, an experience that brings to the fore two fundamental – or perhaps over-arching – weaknesses of WTO Accession under the terms of Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement. Introduction At present six least developed countries have formally sought accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).